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Organizers	  and	  Editors	  The	  workshop	  organizers	  were	  Randy	  Butler	  (co-­‐Chair,	  U.	  of	  Illinois/NCSA),	  and	  Von	  Welch	  (co-­‐Chair,	  Indiana	  U.).	  In	  addition	  Jim	  Basney	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  collecting	  and	  organizing	  workshop	  notes,	  and	  in	  helping	  to	  craft	  the	  workshop	  report,	  and	  Scott	  Koranda	  provided	  a	  valuable	  presentation	  on	  the	  relevant	  experiences	  of	  the	  LIGO	  project.	  	  Organizers	  of	  the	  first	  workshop	  were	  William	  Barnett	  (Indiana	  University),	  Jim	  Basney	  (U.	  of	  Illinois/NCSA),	  Randy	  Butler	  (Chair,	  U.	  of	  Illinois/NCSA),	  and	  Doug	  Pearson	  (REN-­‐ISAC/Indiana	  University)	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   Both	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Executive	  Summary	  Over	  the	  period	  of	  2010-­‐2011,	  a	  series	  of	  two	  workshops	  were	  held	  in	  response	  to	  NSF	  Dear	  Colleague	  Letter	  NSF	  10-­‐050	  calling	  for	  exploratory	  workshops	  to	  consider	  requirements	  for	  Scientific	  Software	  Innovation	  Institutes	  (S2I2s).	  The	  specific	  topic	  of	  the	  workshop	  series	  was	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  a	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  that	  would	  serve	  the	  entire	  NSF	  research	  and	  development	  community.	  	  	  The	  first	  workshop	  was	  held	  on	  August	  6th,	  2010	  in	  Arlington,	  VA	  and	  represented	  an	  initial	  exploration	  of	  the	  topic.	  The	  second	  workshop	  was	  held	  on	  October	  26th,	  2011	  in	  Chicago,	  IL	  and	  its	  goals	  were	  to	  1)	  Extend	  our	  understanding	  of	  relevant	  needs	  of	  MREFC	  and	  large	  NSF	  Projects,	  2)	  refine	  outcome	  from	  first	  workshop	  with	  broader	  community	  input,	  and	  3)	  vet	  concepts	  for	  a	  trusted	  cyberinfrastructure	  institute.	  Towards	  those	  goals,	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  2011	  workshop	  included	  greater	  representation	  from	  MREFC	  and	  large	  NSF	  projects,	  and,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  did	  not	  overlap	  with	  the	  participants	  from	  the	  2010	  workshop.	  	  	  A	  highlight	  of	  the	  second	  workshop	  was,	  at	  the	  invitation	  of	  the	  organizers,	  a	  presentation	  by	  Scott	  Koranda	  of	  the	  LIGO	  project	  on	  the	  history	  of	  LIGO’s	  identity	  management	  activities	  and	  how	  those	  could	  have	  benefited	  from	  a	  security	  institute.	  A	  key	  analysis	  he	  presented	  is	  that,	  by	  his	  estimation,	  LIGO	  could	  have	  saved	  2	  senior	  FTE-­‐years	  of	  effort	  by	  following	  suitable	  expert	  guidance	  had	  it	  existed.	  	  The	  overarching	  finding	  from	  the	  workshops	  is	  that	  security	  is	  a	  critical	  crosscutting	  issue	  for	  the	  NSF	  software	  infrastructure	  and	  recommended	  a	  security-­‐focused	  activity	  to	  address	  this	  issue	  broadly,	  for	  example	  a	  security	  software	  institute	  (S2I2)	  under	  the	  SI2	  program.	  Additionally,	  the	  2010	  workshop	  participants	  agreed	  to	  15	  key	  additional	  findings,	  which	  the	  2011	  workshop	  confirmed,	  with	  some	  refinement	  as	  discussed	  in	  this	  report.	  The	  major	  refinements	  from	  the	  2011	  workshop	  were:	  
• The	  NSF	  CI	  ecosystem	  increasing	  includes	  a	  number	  of	  “cloud”	  and	  other	  services	  provided	  by	  external	  parties.	  Any	  effort	  to	  increase	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  that	  CI	  ecosystem	  must	  take	  those	  services	  into	  account	  in	  addition	  to	  software	  produced	  under	  NSF	  funding.	  
• The	  S2I2	  must	  carefully	  balance	  providing	  a	  service	  unbiased	  towards	  any	  particular	  solution	  with	  keeping	  its	  staff	  suitably	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  through	  their	  involvement	  in	  projects,	  including	  the	  research	  and	  development	  of	  solutions.	  
• Adoption	  of	  orphaned	  software	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  last	  resort	  and	  the	  S2I2	  should	  ideally	  avoid	  it	  if	  at	  all	  possible	  through	  planning	  and	  coordination.	  	  
• Assessment	  of	  software	  and	  services	  is	  valuable,	  but	  the	  S2I2	  must	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  turn	  it	  into	  a	  purely	  bureaucratic	  function.	  
• A	  key	  goal	  of	  the	  S2I2	  in	  providing	  leadership	  is	  the	  continuous	  building	  and	  distribution	  (through	  education,	  training	  and	  workforce	  development)	  of	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  trustworthy	  CI.	  This	  includes	  successes	  and	  lessons	  learned	  from	  projects	  so	  that	  other	  projects	  can	  benefit	  from	  those.	  
• A	  key	  goal	  of	  the	  S2I2	  in	  providing	  leadership	  is	  aggregating	  community	  needs	  and	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  community	  to	  external	  entities	  (e.g.	  InCommon,	  REN-­‐ISAC).	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  These	  refinements	  resulted	  in	  the	  following	  set	  of	  refined	  key	  findings:	  1. A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  provide	  NSF	  and	  the	  NSF	  research	  community	  with	  security	  leadership	  and	  guidance.	  2. A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  provide	  documentation,	  training,	  recommendations,	  and	  consulting	  to	  NSF	  cyberinfrastructure	  projects	  both	  on	  software	  security	  and	  security	  software.	  3. A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  provide	  short-­‐term	  support	  for	  orphaned	  security	  software	  deemed	  critical	  to	  NSF	  cyberinfrastructure	  projects.	  4. A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  perform	  independent	  software	  and	  services	  security	  assessments.	  5. A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  support	  security	  design	  reviews	  of	  MREFC	  projects	  or	  smaller	  CI	  development	  and	  integration	  efforts.	  6. The	  institute	  should	  independently	  highlight/rank	  security	  software	  that	  NSF	  CI	  relies	  upon.	  7. The	  institute	  should	  provide	  a	  security	  auditing	  service	  that	  includes	  vulnerability	  analysis	  and	  overall	  security	  assessment	  that	  validates	  security	  functions	  within	  a	  CI.	  8. The	  institute	  should	  not	  “own”	  software	  to	  avoid	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  between	  fostering	  adoption	  of	  that	  software	  and	  guiding	  communities	  to	  the	  best	  solution	  for	  their	  needs.	  	  Further	  the	  institute	  should	  take	  care	  not	  to	  allow	  their	  participation	  in	  software	  integration	  or	  development	  bias	  their	  future	  recommendations	  of	  that	  software.	  9. The	  institute	  should	  not	  provide	  operational	  security	  services	  or	  replicate	  existing	  services.	  10. The	  institute	  should	  be	  governed	  in	  an	  open	  fashion	  that	  provides	  venues	  for	  stakeholders	  to	  discuss	  priorities	  and	  influence	  the	  institute’s	  activities	  as	  well	  as	  assures	  them	  of	  the	  institute	  not	  being	  influenced	  by	  any	  member’s	  baises.	  11. The	  institute	  should	  be	  a	  synthesis	  point	  for	  expertise	  but	  not	  necessarily	  own	  all	  the	  expertise	  in-­‐house.	  12. The	  institute	  should	  coordinate	  its	  efforts	  and	  seek	  support	  across	  federal	  agencies	  including	  DHS,	  DOE,	  DARPA,	  and	  NIH.	  13. The	  institute	  should	  have	  well	  defined	  relationships	  with	  the	  CMU	  Software	  Engineering	  Institute,	  InCommon,	  Internet2,	  REN-­‐ISAC,	  and	  the	  XD	  TAIS.	  14. Funding	  in	  addition	  to	  funds	  supplied	  by	  NSF	  for	  a	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  should	  be	  aggressively	  pursued.	  15. The	  institute	  must	  document	  how	  it	  would	  gauge	  its	  own	  success.	  	  	  	   	  
	   November	  9,	  2011	   	   	  
7	  	  	  	  
Introduction	  The	  NSF	  Software	  Infrastructure	  for	  Sustained	  Innovation	  (SI2)	  program	  has	  proposed	  to	  establish	  Scientific	  Software	  Innovation	  Institutes	  (S2I2s)	  to	  transform	  grassroots	  computational	  science	  and	  engineering	  software	  into	  robust	  and	  sustained	  software	  infrastructure	  for	  science	  and	  engineering.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  focusing	  on	  community-­‐based	  software	  institutes,	  there	  are	  additional	  opportunities	  to	  provide	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  cyberinfrastructure	  (CI),	  including	  software,	  practices,	  policies,	  and	  services,	  which	  will	  support	  all	  of	  the	  community-­‐based	  institutes	  and	  avoid	  redundant	  efforts	  across	  institutes.	  	  	  A	  series	  of	  two	  workshops	  was	  held	  to	  explore	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  security-­‐focused	  scientific	  software	  innovation	  institute,	  to	  address	  the	  protection,	  integrity,	  and	  reliability	  of	  research	  processes	  and	  information.	  	  The	  workshops	  brought	  together	  representatives	  from	  NSF-­‐funded	  CI	  projects,	  computational	  researchers,	  CI	  developers,	  security	  developers,	  and	  resource	  providers.	  The	  discussions	  covered:	  research	  security	  needs;	  existing	  tools,	  systems,	  processes,	  and	  organizations	  that	  secure	  research	  activities	  and	  data;	  outstanding	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  research	  assurance;	  and	  organization	  and	  operational	  models	  for	  a	  future	  security	  institute	  targeting	  the	  identified	  security	  needs.	  	  These	  workshops	  aided	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  cybersecurity	  software,	  practices,	  policies,	  and	  services	  in	  NSF	  research,	  documented	  the	  security	  requirements	  and	  priorities	  of	  a	  range	  of	  representative	  NSF	  projects	  and	  researchers,	  identified	  outstanding	  needs,	  and	  produced	  recommendations	  for	  next	  steps	  in	  assuring	  the	  integrity	  of	  scientific	  research	  and	  research	  data	  into	  the	  future.	  	  	  A	  report	  from	  the	  first	  workshop	  was	  authored	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  first	  workshop	  and	  is	  available	  on	  the	  workshop	  website:	  	  http://security.ncsa.illinois.edu/s3i2/	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  was	  held	  to	  broaden	  the	  community	  input	  into	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  first	  workshop,	  particularly	  from	  MREFC	  and	  other	  large	  NSF	  projects.	  Towards	  those	  goals,	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  2011	  workshop	  included	  greater	  representation	  from	  MREFC	  and	  large	  NSF	  projects,	  and,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  did	  not	  overlap	  with	  the	  participants	  from	  the	  2010	  workshop.	  
Workshop	  Goals	  The	  goals	  of	  the	  2010	  workshop	  were	  to:	  	  1. Document	  software	  security	  efforts	  in	  place	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  competitive	  landscape	  of	  options,	  	  2. Document	  security	  needs	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  domain	  scientists,	  representing	  virtual	  organizations,	  national	  observatories,	  and	  small	  research	  projects,	  	  3. Recommend	  whether	  a	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  should	  move	  forward	  and,	  if	  so,	  to	  identify	  observatory	  or	  other	  project	  partners,	  organizational	  structures,	  and	  services	  that	  would	  comprise	  this	  institute,	  and	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4. Understand	  the	  parameters,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  financial,	  policy,	  and	  human,	  which	  influence	  sustainable	  security	  for	  research	  cyberinfrastructure.	  	  The	  goals	  of	  the	  2011	  workshop	  were	  to:	  1. Extend	  our	  understanding	  of	  needs	  of	  MREFC	  and	  large	  NSF	  Projects,	  	  2. Refine	  outcome	  from	  first	  workshop	  with	  broader	  community	  input,	  	  3. Vet	  concepts	  for	  a	  trusted	  cyberinfrastructure	  institute.	  
Summary	  of	  Second	  Workshop	  The	  second	  workshop	  was	  held	  on	  October	  26th	  at	  the	  O’Hare	  Hilton	  in	  Chicago	  IL.	  Nineteen	  participants	  (plus	  the	  two	  organizers)	  attended,	  representing	  16	  NSF	  projects	  (TeraGrid/XSEDE,	  LIGO,	  DES,	  NVO,	  LSST,	  OSG,	  LTER,	  DataOne,	  SEAD,	  iRods,	  Data	  Federation	  Network,	  CILogon,	  iPlant,	  IceCube,	  Nimbus,	  OOI)	  plus	  2	  organizations	  (NCAR,	  RENCI)	  and	  the	  broader	  security	  community	  (REN-­‐ISAC).	  The	  workshop	  started	  with	  a	  presentation	  to	  orient	  the	  participants	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  first	  workshop	  and	  describe	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  organizers	  since	  the	  first	  workshop1.	  By	  the	  invitation	  of	  the	  workshop	  organizers,	  Scott	  Koranda	  from	  the	  LIGO	  project	  presented	  details	  on	  LIGO’s	  efforts	  to	  transition	  towards	  a	  single	  authoritative	  roster	  of	  membership,	  which	  supports	  a	  single	  LIGO	  identity	  for	  each	  member2.	  	  Mr	  Koranda	  detailed	  the	  many	  steps,	  setbacks	  and	  successes	  as	  they	  took	  on	  this	  unfunded	  challenge	  as	  best	  they	  could.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  Mr	  Koranda	  estimated	  the	  potential	  savings	  for	  the	  LIGO	  project	  if	  they	  could	  have	  consulted	  with	  a	  security	  focused	  software	  institute:	  	  “It	  is	  difficult	  to	  estimate,	  but	  I	  expect	  if	  a	  NSF	  S3I2	  had	  existed	  and	  offered	  non-­‐biased	  consulting	  services	  around	  IdM	  and	  cybersecurity	  LIGO	  would	  have	  saved	  two	  years	  of	  senior	  FTE	  effort	  (effort	  many	  smaller	  VOs	  do	  not	  have).”	  	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  workshop	  was	  then	  open	  discussion	  with	  moderation	  by	  the	  organizers.	  The	  participants	  selected	  a	  number	  of	  topics	  for	  discussion	  during	  this	  time,	  which	  were:	  1. What	  are	  the	  ways	  to	  implement	  the	  institute?	  a. Who	  are	  the	  experts	  and	  how	  to	  engage	  them?	  	  2. What	  additional	  services	  should	  the	  institute	  consider?	  a. Orphaned	  security	  software	  –	  a	  revisit	  from	  the	  first	  workshop.	  	  b. Handling	  security	  services	  (cloud	  services	  Facebook/Google/EC2/Rackspace).	  	  3. How	  will	  the	  institute	  establish	  and	  maintain	  relevance?	  a. If	  the	  institute	  doesn’t	  develop	  software,	  will	  that	  negatively	  impact	  relevance?	  	  b. Risks	  of	  operating	  in	  a	  purely	  advisory	  role.	  	  c. How	  to	  build	  &	  maintain	  relevance/leadership	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  (15+	  years)	  (and	  short	  term)?	  4. Governance	  of	  institute.	  a. What	  are	  the	  institute’s	  project	  selection	  criteria?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://security.ncsa.illinois.edu/s3i2/S2I3-­‐Oct26-­‐Workshop-­‐slides.pptx	  2	  http://security.ncsa.illinois.edu/s3i2/S3I2WorkshopChicagoOctober2011.pdf	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5. Relationship	  with	  other	  organizations/institutes:	  InCommon,	  REN-­‐ISAC,	  CERT,	  EDUCAUSE,	  Internet2	  Net+	  work.	  6. Sustainability.	  Funding	  sources.	  a. How	  to	  avoid	  bias?	  Sources	  of	  funding.	  7. How	  to	  create	  incentives	  for	  projects	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  security?	  NSF	  requirement	  for	  security	  assessment	  plan?	  8. Project	  Life	  Cycle	  support	  a. Engage	  with	  projects	  prior	  to	  award?	  b. What	  support	  should	  the	  institute	  offer	  at	  each	  project	  phase?	  9. How	  to	  measure	  value	  of	  institute?	  	  The	  results	  of	  these	  discussions	  are	  captured	  in	  the	  subsequent	  section.	  
Workshop	  Output:	  Key	  Attributes	  of	  a	  Security	  Software	  
Institute	  The	  key	  attributes	  of	  a	  security	  software	  institute	  were	  one	  of	  the	  main	  discussion	  topics	  for	  both	  workshops.	  The	  first	  workshop	  produced	  a	  key	  finding	  and	  a	  set	  of	  16	  additional	  findings.	  The	  second	  workshop	  re-­‐affirmed	  these	  finds,	  adding	  refinement.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  present	  those	  findings	  with	  the	  refinements	  from	  the	  second	  workshop.	  	  
Key	  Finding	  The	  key	  finding	  from	  both	  workshops	  was	  that	  security	  is	  a	  critical	  crosscutting	  issue	  for	  the	  NSF	  software	  infrastructure	  that	  must	  be	  addressed	  in	  NSF’s	  Software	  Infrastructure	  for	  Sustained	  Innovation	  (SI2)	  program	  and	  there	  is	  is	  a	  strong	  need	  for	  a	  “long-­‐term	  community-­‐wide	  hub	  of	  software	  excellence”	  focused	  on	  software	  security.	  Security	  is	  a	  fundamental	  building	  block	  that	  facilitates	  cooperation	  and	  collaboration,	  and	  without	  interoperable	  approaches,	  effective	  security	  is	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  Further,	  security	  is	  a	  shared	  requirement	  and	  all	  projects	  could	  benefit	  by	  leveraging	  existing	  proven	  approaches	  and	  implementations.	  Finally,	  because	  security	  expertise	  within	  the	  NSF	  CI	  community	  is	  limited,	  a	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  would	  be	  of	  significant	  benefit	  to	  the	  NSF	  CI	  community.	  	  	  
Additional	  Findings	  Workshop	  participants	  agreed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  key	  findings	  which	  follow,	  grouped	  by	  topic.	  
What	  should	  the	  institute	  do?	  
Finding	  #1:	  A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  provide	  NSF	  and	  the	  NSF	  research	  
community	  with	  security	  leadership	  and	  guidance.	  	  There	  are	  potentially	  multiple	  customers	  for	  this	  service,	  including	  the	  NSF	  and	  the	  NSF	  CI	  community.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  NSF	  as	  a	  customer,	  the	  security	  institute	  could	  provide	  a	  good	  sounding	  board	  for	  the	  development	  of	  new	  ideas	  including	  providing	  non-­‐biased	  opinions	  to	  NSF	  on	  the	  potential	  usefulness	  or	  need	  for	  a	  suggested	  new	  development	  activity	  or	  the	  list	  of	  existing	  related	  activities	  so	  that	  there	  is	  less	  duplication.	  	  Likely	  this	  would	  be	  input	  into	  the	  development	  of	  new	  solicitations	  and	  not	  part	  of	  the	  proposal	  review	  process.	  	  The	  institute	  could	  additionally	  provide	  security	  guidance	  and	  leadership	  to	  the	  NSF	  CI	  community,	  i.e.	  those	  developing,	  deploying	  or	  operating	  CI	  in	  support	  of	  NSF	  funded	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projects.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  institute	  should	  identify	  common	  requirements	  and	  document	  technologies	  and	  common	  approaches	  to	  assist	  these	  projects	  in	  developing	  their	  approach	  to	  security.	  Additional	  information	  dissemination	  about	  a	  range	  of	  topics	  could	  be	  valuable,	  including	  the	  documentation	  of	  threats	  and	  attacks	  and	  the	  security	  landscape	  (new	  technologies	  and	  services).	  	  The	  participants	  drew	  analogies	  with	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Science	  model	  and	  recommended	  that	  a	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  could	  develop	  reports	  that	  the	  community	  takes	  seriously.	  	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  confirmed	  this	  finding	  from	  the	  2010	  workshop.	  A	  key	  refinement	  made	  was	  that	  such	  an	  institute	  should	  also	  provide	  an	  aggregated	  voice	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  NSF	  community	  in	  interactions	  with	  external	  communities	  (e.g.,	  InCommon,	  REN-­‐ISAC).	  	  
Finding	  #2:	  A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  provide	  documentation,	  training,	  
recommendations,	  and	  consulting	  to	  NSF	  cyberinfrastructure	  projects	  both	  on	  
software	  security	  and	  security	  software.	  	  Security	  training	  and	  documentation	  should	  be	  focused	  around	  helping	  CI	  developers,	  those	  that	  deploy	  CI	  to	  integrate	  and	  support	  security	  technologies.	  It	  might	  include	  documentation	  on	  how	  to	  perform	  a	  risk	  and	  threat	  analysis,	  how	  to	  deploy	  and	  utilize	  security	  software,	  how	  to	  develop	  or	  improve	  usable	  software	  that	  is	  secure.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  institute	  could	  provide	  guidance	  to	  software	  developers	  in	  providing	  well	  thought	  out	  diagnostics	  and	  provide	  documentation	  to	  assist	  those	  using	  the	  software	  in	  diagnosing	  problems	  that	  may	  arise.	  	  Further	  the	  institute	  might	  assist	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  project	  managers	  in	  their	  design	  and	  deployment	  efforts.	  	  	  	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  identified	  a	  key	  goal	  for	  the	  institute,	  which	  is	  the	  constant	  building	  and	  disseminating	  of	  cybersecurity	  knowledge.	  This	  would	  include	  documenting	  the	  approaches	  to	  security	  that	  each	  project	  takes	  on,	  and	  the	  successes	  and	  lessons	  learned,	  which	  would	  serve	  to	  assist	  other	  projects	  in	  making	  decisions.	  	  Training	  materials,	  training	  events,	  workforce	  development	  and	  workshops	  designed	  around	  knowledge	  transfer	  were	  identified	  in	  the	  2011	  workshop	  as	  and	  key	  deliverables	  for	  the	  institute.	  	  Participants	  cited	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  institute	  is	  in	  transferring	  knowledge	  from	  security	  experts,	  lessons	  learn,	  and	  the	  successes	  and	  failures	  of	  each	  project,	  to	  other	  projects	  and	  project	  development	  staff.	  	  	  However,	  direct	  end-­‐user	  training	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  out-­‐of-­‐scope	  for	  the	  institute;	  where	  end-­‐user	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  customer	  of	  a	  CI	  project.	  	  Instead	  the	  institute	  should	  provide	  support	  to	  other	  organizations	  that	  do	  end-­‐user	  training.	  	  Closely	  related	  to	  documentation	  and	  training	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  provide	  assistance	  to	  developers	  and	  those	  deploying	  security	  software	  for	  basic	  support	  assistance.	  This	  may	  be	  implemented	  as	  a	  clearinghouse	  to	  direct	  people	  to	  the	  most	  appropriate	  source	  of	  information	  or	  it	  may	  provide	  them	  with	  documented	  use	  case	  examples.	  	  
Finding	  #3:	  A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  provide	  short-­‐term	  support	  for	  orphaned	  
security	  software	  deemed	  critical	  to	  NSF	  cyberinfrastructure	  projects.	  It	  should	  facilitate	  the	  location	  of	  a	  new	  long-­‐term	  base	  of	  support	  for	  the	  software	  or	  assist	  projects	  in	  transitioning	  to	  better-­‐supported	  alternatives.	  There	  is	  a	  potential	  role	  for	  the	  institute	  with	  respect	  to	  short-­‐term	  support	  for,	  or	  advocacy	  for,	  critical	  security	  software	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  supported.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  need	  for	  the	  institute	  to	  pick	  up	  support	  for	  a	  temporary	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period	  while	  working	  with	  the	  community	  to	  identify	  a	  longer-­‐term	  support	  mechanism.	  The	  institute	  would	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  identifying	  what	  security	  software	  was	  critical	  to	  the	  NSF	  community	  and	  advocate	  on	  its	  behalf	  to	  NSF	  and	  other	  organizations	  that	  may	  be	  able	  to	  assist	  in	  its	  support.	  Further,	  the	  institute	  may	  play	  a	  role	  in	  advocating	  the	  integration	  of	  key	  security	  software	  into	  both	  commercial	  and	  larger	  open	  source	  software.	  	  In	  further	  discussions	  in	  the	  2011	  workshop	  there	  was	  concern	  over	  the	  institute	  becoming	  saddled	  with	  orphaned	  software.	  	  In	  fact	  some	  participants	  worried	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  institute	  may	  actually	  encourage	  some	  developers	  to	  abandon	  their	  software,	  hoping	  the	  institute	  would	  then	  pick	  it	  up.	  	  Additionally	  there	  was	  concern	  that	  the	  institute	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  non-­‐biased	  entity	  once	  it	  is	  supporting	  software,	  and	  finally	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  institute	  would	  have	  a	  sufficient	  software	  development	  staff	  to	  support	  any	  software.	  	  Participants	  of	  the	  second	  workshop	  strongly	  encouraged	  that	  the	  institute	  take	  steps	  to	  mitigate	  the	  negative	  impacts	  of	  abandoned	  critical	  security	  software,	  short	  of	  supporting	  it	  directly.	  	  Suggestions	  were	  to	  first	  look	  for	  alternative	  solutions,	  next	  work	  with	  the	  project	  teams	  that	  were	  dependent	  on	  the	  software	  to	  see	  if	  any	  project	  team	  could	  pick	  up	  support	  within	  their	  project,	  if	  not	  then	  work	  collaboratively	  with	  all	  the	  projects	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  software	  for	  a	  solution	  and	  if	  all	  those	  efforts	  fail	  then	  seek	  out	  a	  3rd	  party	  for	  support	  either	  directly	  or	  by	  working	  with	  NSF.	  	  
Finding	  #4:	  A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  perform	  independent	  software	  and	  
services	  security	  assessment.	  A	  security	  institute	  should	  support	  the	  independent	  assessment	  of	  software	  from	  a	  security	  point	  of	  view,	  as	  is	  done	  in	  the	  Middleware	  Security	  and	  Testing	  (MIST)	  project	  at	  UW-­‐Madison.	  The	  independence	  of	  the	  assessment	  is	  a	  critical	  attribute	  to	  lessen	  the	  potential	  for	  negative	  biases	  and	  assure	  community	  trust.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  commercial	  tools	  for	  software	  assessment	  including	  Nessus,	  Coverity,	  and	  Fortify;	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  expertise	  in	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  results	  and	  address	  the	  issues	  identified.	  Additionally,	  there	  are	  other	  aspects	  of	  assessment	  that	  are	  currently	  human-­‐oriented,	  such	  as	  architectural	  analysis	  and	  analysis	  of	  services	  for	  which	  the	  software	  is	  not	  available	  (e.g.,	  cloud	  services)	  –	  see	  Finding	  #7.	  The	  institute	  should	  provide	  this	  service	  to	  the	  development	  teams	  in	  a	  responsible	  manner	  so	  as	  to	  encourage	  continued	  collaboration	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  providing	  more	  secure	  software.	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  also	  identified	  that	  the	  NSF	  CI	  community	  is	  increasingly	  using	  cloud	  services	  (e.g.,	  Amazon	  EC2)	  and	  assessment	  of	  how	  the	  use	  of	  these	  services	  affects	  the	  security	  risks	  of	  NSF	  research	  is	  increasingly	  important.	  The	  second	  workshop	  also	  identified	  the	  concern	  that	  the	  institute	  needs	  to	  take	  care	  not	  to	  turn	  assessment	  into	  a	  purely	  bureaucratic	  function	  (a	  checkbox	  that	  projects	  must	  complete	  at	  some	  point),	  but	  instead	  a	  meaningful	  part	  of	  transitioning	  any	  CI	  from	  a	  research	  phase	  to	  a	  production	  phase.	  	  
Finding	  #5:	  A	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  support	  security	  design	  reviews	  of	  MREFC	  
projects	  or	  smaller	  CI	  development	  and	  integration	  efforts.	  	  The	  institute	  could	  provide	  a	  list	  of	  architecture-­‐related	  reviews	  including	  risk	  and	  threat	  analysis,	  policy	  examples,	  architecture,	  and	  implementation	  design	  reviews.	  	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  expanded	  upon	  this	  finding	  suggesting	  that	  the	  institute	  could	  provide	  documentation	  on	  what	  a	  security	  design	  should	  include,	  how	  to	  develop	  one,	  and	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examples.	  	  Further	  the	  institute	  could	  assist	  projects	  by	  performing	  preliminary	  security	  design	  reviews	  to	  better	  prepare	  them	  for	  the	  official	  review.	  	  	  
Finding	  #6:	  The	  institute	  should	  independently	  highlight/rank	  security	  software	  that	  
NSF	  CI	  relies	  upon.	  Independent	  assessment	  of	  value	  could	  help	  software	  owners	  obtain	  funding	  and	  help	  infrastructure	  providers	  make	  informed	  decisions	  about	  which	  software	  to	  deploy.	  The	  institute	  should	  use	  clearly	  defined	  metrics	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  security	  software	  for	  the	  NSF	  community.	  Such	  metrics	  might	  include	  a	  listing	  of	  related	  software	  that	  has	  similar	  capabilities,	  dependencies	  on	  other	  software,	  usage	  statistics	  and	  a	  listing	  of	  what	  projects	  are	  using	  the	  software,	  what	  other	  software	  it	  has	  been	  successfully	  integrated	  with,	  what	  software	  it	  typically	  works	  with,	  and	  how	  well	  it	  meets	  security	  assessment	  guidelines.	  The	  institute	  could	  also	  provide	  an	  unbiased	  “weather	  forecast”	  (report	  on	  longevity/support)	  on	  security	  software,	  that	  goes	  beyond	  a	  simple	  ranking	  based	  on	  functionality	  and	  supportability	  into	  assessments	  based	  on	  longer-­‐term	  support	  issues	  that	  might	  require	  a	  more	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  the	  funding	  landscape	  for	  software	  development	  projects.	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  confirmed	  this	  finding.	  	  
Finding	  #7:	  The	  institute	  should	  provide	  a	  security	  auditing	  service	  that	  includes	  
vulnerability	  analysis	  and	  overall	  security	  assessment	  that	  validates	  security	  
functions	  within	  a	  CI.	  This	  is	  related	  in	  some	  sense	  to	  finding	  #4,	  however	  where	  that	  focuses	  on	  software	  assessment	  this	  recommendation	  is	  a	  focused	  assessment	  of	  the	  larger	  CI.	  This	  could	  involve	  documenting	  security	  guidelines	  with	  exemplars	  that	  projects	  operating	  CI	  could	  follow.	  The	  extent	  of	  how	  far	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  security	  assessment	  should	  be	  taken	  is	  unclear.	  	  Operational	  security	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  entire	  CI	  environment	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  critical	  that	  any	  audit	  include	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  broader	  CI,	  however	  this	  could	  represent	  a	  huge	  time	  commitment.	  	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  discussed	  the	  need	  for	  supporting	  project	  teams	  that	  are	  transitioning	  from	  development	  to	  operations.	  	  Preparing	  them	  to	  document	  security	  policies	  and	  how	  to	  enforce	  those	  policies	  through	  operational	  practices	  and	  procedures,	  and	  the	  following	  up	  with	  reviews	  as	  described	  above	  to	  ensure	  they	  are	  conforming	  to	  their	  own	  policies	  and	  best	  practice.	  
What	  should	  the	  institute	  not	  do?	  	  The	  workshop	  provided	  a	  good	  venue	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  not	  only	  what	  a	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  might	  do	  but	  also	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  services	  and	  activities	  that	  it	  should	  not	  do.	  The	  “do	  not	  do”	  topics	  covered	  at	  the	  workshop	  would	  each	  draw	  such	  an	  institute	  away	  from	  an	  unbiased	  center	  of	  excellence	  and	  would	  limit	  such	  an	  institute’s	  ability	  to	  influence	  and	  lead	  the	  NSF	  CI	  community	  in	  security	  solutions	  for	  NSF	  CI.	  	  The	  institute	  should	  take	  care	  not	  to	  allow	  their	  participation	  in	  software	  integration	  or	  development	  bias	  their	  future	  recommendations	  of	  that	  software.	  	  
Finding	  #8:	  The	  institute	  should	  not	  “own”	  software	  to	  avoid	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  
between	  fostering	  adoption	  of	  that	  software	  and	  guiding	  communities	  to	  the	  best	  
solution	  for	  their	  needs.	  Through	  the	  course	  of	  engagements	  the	  institute’s	  development	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staff	  may	  participate	  and	  even	  lead	  software	  development	  efforts.	  	  Before	  beginning	  such	  a	  project	  the	  institute	  will	  document	  how	  the	  proposed	  software	  will	  be	  supported	  and	  further	  any	  and	  all	  software	  developed	  will	  be	  open-­‐sourced	  with	  an	  identified	  support	  strategy.	  	  Acceptable	  support	  strategies	  include	  support	  by	  the	  community/project	  for	  which	  the	  software	  was	  developed	  or	  an	  open-­‐source	  software	  development	  community.	  The	  NSF	  SI2	  solicitation	  identifies	  the	  need	  to	  sustain	  software	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  need	  to	  create	  anchors	  and	  leadership.	  Combining	  these	  can	  cause	  conflicts.	  One	  institute	  can’t	  effectively	  do	  both,	  because	  the	  former	  causes	  biases	  for	  the	  latter.	  This	  discussion	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  earlier	  discussions	  about	  the	  key	  attributes	  of	  the	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  and	  workshop	  participants’	  feeling	  that	  the	  primary	  role	  of	  the	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  was	  to	  provide	  the	  NSF	  research	  community	  with	  unbiased	  leadership.	  There	  was	  strong	  feeling	  that	  the	  institute	  could	  not	  maintain	  an	  unbiased	  approach	  if	  it	  had	  any	  direct	  ties	  to	  software	  in	  the	  form	  of	  support.	  The	  institute	  should	  not	  directly	  develop	  specific	  software	  products	  unless	  there	  is	  a	  clearly	  identified	  support	  team	  outside	  of	  the	  institute.	  The	  institute	  must	  be	  non-­‐biased	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  advisory	  role	  to	  projects	  and	  to	  NSF.	  Owning	  software	  would	  bias	  the	  institute	  towards	  the	  solution	  set	  of	  the	  participants.	  	  	  	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  confirmed	  this	  finding	  from	  the	  2010	  workshop.	  It	  did	  discuss	  however	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  institute	  being	  involved	  in	  research	  and	  development	  versus	  its	  members	  being	  involved	  in	  research	  and	  development.	  The	  participants	  recognized	  that	  expertise	  is	  acquired	  and	  maintained	  through	  being	  involved	  in	  research	  and	  development	  of	  new	  solutions,	  and	  hence	  institute	  team	  members	  involvement	  in	  research	  and	  development	  activities	  to	  maintain	  their	  expertise	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  positive.	  Governance	  of	  the	  institute	  needs	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  bias	  of	  any	  member	  towards	  the	  solutions	  they	  have	  developed	  does	  not	  influence	  the	  service	  provided	  by	  the	  institute.	  	  Additionally	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  the	  institute	  could	  serve	  to	  assist	  the	  transition	  of	  security	  research	  software,	  where	  security	  focused	  software	  means	  software	  developed	  by	  security	  researchers	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  hardened	  for	  production	  environments.	  	  	  Suggestions	  included	  staying	  abreast	  of	  security	  research	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  research	  software	  that	  shows	  potential	  to	  solve	  an	  existing	  or	  expected	  gap	  in	  NSF	  CI	  and	  providing	  either	  a	  matchmaking	  between	  a	  CI	  project	  in	  need	  with	  the	  security	  research	  group,	  or	  in	  advocating	  to	  NSF	  for	  the	  need	  to	  harden	  the	  code.	  	  Finally	  the	  workshop	  participants	  felt,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  the	  institute	  to	  play	  a	  role	  here,	  as	  it	  would	  likely	  translate	  into	  both	  development	  and	  support	  of	  software.	  	  However	  if	  an	  acceptable	  support	  solution	  is	  identified	  then	  the	  institute	  could	  participate	  in	  these	  activities.	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  confirmed	  this	  finding	  from	  the	  2010	  workshop,	  with	  the	  same	  distinction	  between	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  institute	  versus	  its	  membership.	  	  
Recommendation	  #9:	  The	  institute	  should	  not	  provide	  operational	  security	  services	  
or	  replicate	  existing	  services.	  If	  the	  security	  institute	  supported	  operational	  security	  services,	  such	  as	  an	  identity	  management	  service	  or	  monitoring,	  those	  services	  would	  likely	  influence	  or	  bias	  the	  institute	  to	  recommend	  that	  service,	  therefore	  causing	  the	  institute	  to	  lose	  credibility.	  The	  institute	  should	  maintain	  independence	  from	  security	  operations.	  	  In	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some	  cases	  there	  are	  already	  existing	  services,	  and	  the	  participants	  clearly	  felt	  that	  a	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  should	  not	  replicate	  existing	  security	  services.	  	  Examples	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  services	  include	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to:	  	  
• Coordination	  of	  software	  vulnerability	  handling:	  The	  institute	  should	  not	  duplicate	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  CERTs	  to	  handle	  software	  vulnerabilities,	  but	  it	  could	  provide	  guidance	  to	  NSF	  CI	  projects	  on	  vulnerability	  handling	  policies	  and	  procedures	  and	  assist	  the	  projects	  in	  connecting	  with	  the	  appropriate	  coordinating	  organizations	  (i.e.,	  CERTs).	  	  
• Security	  incident	  information	  sharing:	  REN-­‐ISAC	  already	  provides	  a	  valuable	  service	  for	  the	  sharing	  of	  security	  incident	  information,	  which	  should	  be	  leveraged	  and	  not	  be	  replicated.	  	  	  
• Security	  monitoring:	  The	  institute	  should	  not	  provide	  monitoring	  services	  for	  projects	  that	  have	  24/7	  operational	  services	  but	  are	  lacking	  staff	  to	  perform	  security	  monitoring	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  events.	  It	  is	  important	  for	  the	  institute	  to	  remain	  free	  of	  operational	  services	  including	  security	  monitoring,	  as	  it	  would	  be	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  software	  focus	  of	  the	  institute.	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  confirmed	  this	  finding	  from	  the	  2010	  workshop,	  in	  that	  the	  institute	  should	  not	  provide	  operational	  security	  services,	  although	  there	  was	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  providing	  guidance,	  documentation	  and	  training	  on	  operational	  security	  to	  assist	  projects	  that	  are	  transitioning	  into	  production	  as	  well	  as	  those	  projects	  already	  in	  production.	  	  The	  institute	  could	  assist	  in	  development	  of	  policies,	  and	  procedures	  through	  best	  practice	  guides,	  documented	  examples,	  and	  focused	  training.	  	  	  	  There	  was	  additional	  discussion	  of	  leveraging	  the	  experience	  of	  distributed	  security	  teams	  such	  as	  the	  one	  found	  within	  the	  eXtreme	  Science	  and	  Engineering	  Discovery	  Environment	  (XSEDE)	  project.	  
Governance	  Models	  For	  a	  security	  focused	  software	  institute	  to	  be	  successful,	  it	  must	  be	  an	  unbiased	  entity	  that	  provides	  the	  NSF	  research	  community	  with	  leadership	  and	  recommendations.	  Therefore,	  the	  institute	  will	  require	  a	  strong,	  well-­‐documented	  governance	  model.	  This	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  fourth	  workshop	  objective:	  to	  understand	  the	  parameters,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  
financial,	  policy,	  and	  human,	  which	  influence	  sustainable	  security	  for	  research	  
cyberinfrastructure.	  	  What	  is	  governance?	  Governance	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  stakeholders	  oversee	  the	  management	  of	  an	  operation	  or	  institute.	  	  	  Governance	  includes	  policies	  and	  objectives	  (community	  driven,	  strategic),	  together	  with	  staff	  people	  (managerial,	  tactical).	  The	  policies	  and	  objectives	  are	  meant	  to	  serve	  the	  institute’s	  stakeholders	  so	  it	  is	  important	  to	  first	  understand	  whom	  those	  stakeholders	  are.	  The	  stakeholders	  include	  four	  primary	  group:	  1)	  software	  developers	  that	  create	  software	  for	  NSF	  researchers,	  2)	  NSF-­‐funded	  CI	  projects	  that	  are	  deploying	  and	  supporting	  infrastructure,	  3)	  the	  other	  SI2	  awardees,	  and	  4)	  NSF	  itself.	  The	  workshop	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participants	  felt	  that	  such	  an	  institute	  would	  not	  directly	  support	  NSF	  CI	  end-­‐users.	  It	  is	  also	  unlikely	  that	  the	  institute	  would	  serve	  university	  campuses.	  	  
Recommendation	  #10:	  The	  institute	  should	  be	  governed	  in	  an	  open	  fashion	  that	  
provides	  venues	  for	  stakeholders	  to	  discuss	  priorities	  and	  influence	  the	  institute’s	  
activities	  as	  well	  as	  assures	  them	  of	  the	  institute	  not	  being	  influenced	  by	  any	  
member’s	  biases.	  	  Stakeholders	  translate	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  institute	  into	  policies	  that	  guide	  management.	  Institute	  managers	  then	  make	  decisions,	  based	  on	  those	  policies	  and	  goals,	  about	  how	  to	  allocate	  resources	  and	  undertake	  tasks.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute,	  management	  would	  allocate	  time	  to	  training,	  software	  assessment,	  and	  other	  work	  of	  the	  institute.	  	  Stakeholders	  subsequently	  review	  the	  performance	  of	  institute	  management	  in	  terms	  of	  outcomes,	  efficiency,	  and	  effectiveness	  to	  ensure	  alignment	  with	  policies	  and	  goals.	  	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  a	  range	  of	  governance	  models	  from	  the	  highly	  participatory	  to	  central	  authority	  models.	  	  Highly	  participatory	  models	  provide	  for	  an	  excellent	  way	  to	  gather	  consensus,	  however	  they	  often	  suffer	  from	  a	  loss	  of	  focus	  and	  follow-­‐through	  as	  priorities	  change.	  The	  central	  authority	  model,	  meanwhile,	  lacks	  the	  open	  participation	  in	  priority	  setting	  but	  can	  do	  an	  excellent	  job	  staying	  of	  task.	  	  Examples	  of	  governance	  approaches	  that	  fall	  somewhere	  in	  the	  middle	  include	  the	  one-­‐page	  proposals	  process	  for	  LIGO	  and	  the	  CILogon	  workshops	  that	  set	  project	  priorities	  and	  goals	  based	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  constituents.	  	  Both	  LIGO	  and	  CILogon	  governance	  models	  involve	  active	  community	  engagement	  and	  participation,	  however	  in	  the	  end	  the	  projects	  make	  the	  final	  priority	  decisions.	  	  	  Example	  governance	  models	  such	  as	  the	  executive	  and	  technical	  advisory	  boards	  for	  REN-­‐ISAC,	  the	  NEES	  external	  governance	  board,	  and	  the	  Open	  Science	  Grid’s	  consortium-­‐based	  advisory	  boards	  were	  discussed	  as	  viable	  options.	  These	  organizations	  all	  have	  found	  these	  “internal”	  advisory	  boards	  to	  be	  far	  more	  effective	  than	  external	  advisory	  boards,	  where	  board	  members	  don’t	  have	  a	  stake.	  	  The	  2011	  workshop	  discussed	  how	  an	  open	  governance	  model	  was	  also	  important	  to	  ensure	  stakeholders	  would	  feel	  secure	  in	  knowing	  the	  services	  they	  were	  receiving	  from	  the	  institute	  were	  not	  biased	  towards	  a	  particular	  solution.	  Acknowledging	  that	  all	  people	  have	  biases	  and	  that	  being	  involved	  with	  researching	  and	  developing	  solutions	  are	  critical	  to	  gaining	  and	  maintaining	  expertise,	  the	  institute’s	  governance	  is	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  biases	  of	  the	  institute’s	  members	  don’t	  influence	  the	  help	  it	  provides.	  	  
Finding	  #11:	  The	  institute	  should	  be	  a	  synthesis	  point	  for	  expertise	  but	  not	  
necessarily	  own	  all	  the	  expertise	  in-­‐house.	  It	  was	  felt	  that	  the	  institutes	  would	  not	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  house	  the	  experts	  for	  all	  areas	  and	  that	  they	  should	  instead	  draw	  on	  the	  combined	  expertise	  within	  the	  NSF	  research	  community.	  An	  open	  question	  was:	  if	  the	  institute	  pulled	  in	  knowledge	  from	  external	  contributors,	  what	  would	  be	  the	  incentive	  for	  external	  participation?	  	  There	  were	  extended	  discussions	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  the	  second	  workshop	  and	  which	  focused	  on	  how	  to	  attract	  expertise	  to	  the	  institute,	  or	  rather	  on	  what	  might	  be	  incentives	  for	  security	  experts	  to	  make	  themselves	  available	  to	  the	  institute.	  	  While	  no	  solution	  was	  arrived	  at	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  this	  could	  be	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  institute	  to	  overcome.	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Key	  Relationships	  Workshop	  participants	  were	  also	  interested	  in	  identifying	  if	  there	  was	  potential	  for	  different	  types	  of	  software	  institutes,	  and	  if	  so	  how	  would	  a	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  fit	  into	  the	  larger	  SI2	  ecosystem?	  The	  open	  question	  was	  whether	  there	  would	  be	  a	  single	  general	  purpose	  S2I2	  with	  affiliated	  specialized	  S2I2s	  such	  as	  the	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  discussed	  at	  this	  workshop.	  Many	  of	  the	  workshop	  participants	  felt	  that	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  possibility	  of	  a	  more	  general	  S2I2	  that	  addresses	  crosscutting	  CI	  software;	  if	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  clearly	  a	  security-­‐focused	  institute	  would	  coordinate	  through	  the	  more	  general	  S2I2.	  	  
Finding	  #12:	  The	  institute	  should	  coordinate	  its	  efforts	  and	  seek	  support	  across	  
federal	  agencies	  including	  DHS,	  DOE,	  DARPA,	  and	  NIH.	  Participants	  strongly	  favored	  
linking	  the	  proposed	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  with	  other	  federal	  agencies	  
such	  as	  DHS,	  DOE,	  and	  DARPA.	  Participants	  were	  interested	  in	  how	  this	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  might	  coordinate	  cross	  agency	  and	  even	  gain	  support	  through	  funding	  or	  other	  avenues	  from	  these	  other	  agencies.	  	  	  This	  was	  lightly	  discussed	  in	  the	  second	  workshop	  and	  participants	  saw	  this	  cross	  agency	  coordination	  as	  a	  difficult	  challenge	  for	  the	  institute	  and	  that	  the	  goal	  here	  ought	  to	  be	  to	  look	  for	  and	  assist	  in	  any	  cross	  agency	  coordination	  efforts.	  The	  concern	  was	  also	  raised	  that	  as	  the	  institute	  found	  support	  from	  other	  sources,	  it	  would	  need	  to	  take	  care	  not	  to	  take	  on	  conflicting	  priorities,	  which	  could	  make	  serving	  the	  NSF	  community	  more	  difficult.	  	  
Finding	  #13:	  The	  institute	  should	  have	  well	  defined	  relationships	  with	  other	  S2I2s,	  
the	  CMU	  Software	  Engineering	  Institute,	  InCommon,	  Internet2,	  REN-­‐ISAC,	  and	  the	  XD	  
TAIS.	  	  The	  list	  here	  is	  not	  exhaustive	  nor	  is	  it	  intended	  to	  be,	  rather	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  highlight	  that	  a	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  needs	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  an	  array	  of	  relationships	  with	  other	  projects,	  agencies,	  standards	  bodies,	  and	  organizations	  with	  related	  and	  complementary	  expertise.	  	  Further,	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  relationships	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  just	  national	  efforts,	  but	  the	  institute	  should	  recognize	  and	  establish	  relationships	  with	  both	  national	  and	  international	  bodies.	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  confirmed	  this	  finding.	  
Financial	  Stability	  
Finding	  #14:	  Funding	  in	  addition	  to	  funds	  supplied	  by	  NSF	  for	  a	  security-­‐focused	  
software	  institute	  should	  be	  pursued.	  Financial	  stability	  of	  such	  an	  institute	  was	  discussed	  and	  the	  participants	  explored	  a	  various	  options.	  It	  was	  assumed	  that	  a	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  would	  begin	  under	  grant	  funding	  but	  that	  the	  funding	  model	  might	  evolve	  over	  time.	  It	  was	  not	  clear	  to	  the	  participants	  that	  such	  an	  institute	  could	  be	  sustained	  without	  NSF	  funding,	  however	  the	  group	  felt	  that	  other	  supplemental	  funding	  could	  potentially	  be	  developed,	  including	  institutional	  underwriters	  such	  as	  was	  developed	  by	  the	  Saki	  project,	  volunteer	  membership	  model	  such	  as	  with	  Linux,	  fee	  for	  service,	  corporate	  partnership/sponsorship,	  and	  support	  from	  other	  government	  agencies.	  It	  was	  felt	  that	  long-­‐term	  funding	  from	  NSF	  would	  be	  critical	  in	  sustaining	  longer-­‐term	  coordinated	  activities.	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Participants	  from	  the	  second	  workshop	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  non-­‐biased	  nature	  of	  the	  institute	  if	  it	  were	  to	  actively	  seek	  additional	  outside	  funding	  as	  that	  may	  force	  the	  institute	  to	  lean	  one	  direction	  or	  the	  other.	  	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  the	  institute	  should	  not	  author	  proposals	  for	  funding.	  	  
Gauging	  Success	  
Finding	  #15:	  The	  institute	  must	  document	  how	  it	  would	  gauge	  its	  own	  success.	  Initial	  justification	  for	  funding	  a	  security-­‐focused	  S2I2	  would	  have	  to	  come	  from	  a	  speculative	  assessment	  of	  community	  needs,	  but	  longer-­‐term	  funding	  should	  be	  justified	  by	  real	  metrics	  that	  assess	  the	  impact	  that	  such	  an	  institute	  is	  having,	  such	  as	  how	  many	  projects	  utilize	  the	  institute.	  Other	  metrics	  may	  include	  measurement	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  NSF	  communities	  towards	  the	  institute’s	  suggested	  approach,	  the	  level	  of	  participation	  in	  institute-­‐organized	  workshops	  or	  training,	  and	  how	  many	  experts	  are	  engaged	  in	  supporting	  the	  institute’s	  goals.	  	  	  The	  second	  workshop	  discussed	  the	  need	  for	  metrics	  as	  one	  way	  to	  help	  establish	  and	  maintain	  relevance.	  	  The	  participants	  however	  did	  not	  identify	  specific	  required	  metrics	  for	  the	  institute.	  
Conclusions	  This	  workshop	  series	  explored	  the	  topic	  of	  a	  security-­‐focused	  scientific	  software	  innovation	  institute.	  	  There	  was	  enthusiastic	  agreement	  that	  such	  a	  security-­‐focused	  software	  institute	  would	  benefit	  both	  individual	  NSF	  CI	  activities	  and	  projects,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  a	  broad	  leadership	  and	  guidance	  across	  all	  NSF	  CI	  activities.	  	  A	  number	  of	  ideas	  and	  possibilities	  were	  discussed	  at	  a	  high-­‐level	  during	  the	  two,	  daylong	  workshops	  that	  resulted	  in	  15	  distinct	  findings	  that	  NSF	  should	  consider	  as	  they	  develop	  a	  solicitation	  around	  the	  S2I2	  theme.	  	  Those	  recommendations	  fell	  generally	  into	  five	  categories:	  1)	  key	  activities	  of	  the	  institute,	  2)	  key	  activities	  to	  avoid,	  3)	  governance	  recommendations,	  4)	  key	  relationships	  the	  institute	  should	  support,	  and	  5)	  financial	  support	  recommendations.	  	  	  	  Key	  recommended	  activities	  included	  providing	  leadership	  and	  guidance	  on	  security	  topics	  to	  NSF	  and	  the	  NSF	  research	  community,	  providing	  documentation,	  training,	  and	  consulting	  advice,	  shepherding	  of	  critical	  orphaned	  security	  software,	  software	  security	  assessments,	  security	  design	  reviews,	  ranking	  of	  security	  software,	  and	  security	  auditing.	  	  Workshop	  participants	  felt	  strongly	  that	  such	  an	  institute	  should	  not	  develop	  new	  software,	  integrate	  software,	  provide	  operational	  security	  services,	  or	  replicate	  existing	  services.	  	  However	  the	  institute	  could	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  identifying	  security	  research	  software	  that	  has	  potential	  to	  fill	  NSF	  CI	  gaps,	  and	  further	  the	  institute	  should	  assist	  in	  matchmaking	  between	  security	  researchers,	  and	  CI	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  advocating	  to	  NSF	  to	  provide	  assistance	  in	  production	  hardening	  of	  this	  software.	  	  Such	  an	  institute	  should	  be	  governed	  in	  an	  open	  fashion	  that	  supports	  stakeholder	  input,	  and	  the	  institute	  should	  draw	  expertise	  broadly	  through	  collaborative	  relationships.	  	  The	  institute	  should	  develop	  metrics	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  assist	  in	  measuring	  impact	  and	  to	  guide	  the	  institute	  in	  setting	  priorities.	  	  The	  institute	  should	  develop	  and	  maintain	  relationships	  with	  other	  federal	  agencies	  and	  a	  number	  of	  existing	  community	  efforts	  and	  NSF-­‐funded	  projects.	  	  Finally,	  such	  an	  institute	  should	  aggressively	  seek	  methods	  to	  supplement	  any	  NSF	  funding.	  
